A Rational Inattention Perspective on Equilibrium Asset Pricing under Heterogeneous Information with Structural Breaks and Market Efficiency by Steve, Heinke & Niels, Warmuth
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Rational Inattention Perspective on
Equilibrium Asset Pricing under
Heterogeneous Information with
Structural Breaks and Market Efficiency
Heinke Steve and Warmuth Niels
University of Zurich, Munich University of Technology
2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/68715/
MPRA Paper No. 68715, posted 8. January 2016 14:27 UTC
A Rational Inattention Perspective on Equilibrium Asset
Pricing under Heterogeneous Information with Structural
Breaks and Market Efficiency
By Steve Heinke and Niels J. Warmuth∗
In this paper we present a new model of how information travels
within financial markets and present empirical evidence that the
concept of attention driven information efficiency is more conju-
gate with market data as compared to the prevailing concept of
efficient markets. Augmenting our model by a shift component
made it possible to explain shifts in asset prices by a lack of atten-
tion on small permanent changes in the fundamentals. This can
also be seen as a micro-level explanation of the momentum effect.
By a further augmentation of the model through the introduction
of heterogeneous information processing capacities we are able to
give a fundamental interpretation of the financial services indus-
try as providers of information processing capacity. Moreover, the
burst of the housing bubble in the US and the successful bet of John
Paulson against it are shown to be prime empirical examples of our
framework.
JEL: C60, D80, D83, D84, D92, G12, G14
Keywords: Limited attention, asset pricing, rational inattention,
momentum trading
∗ Heinke, Steve: University of Zurich, Wintherturerstrasse 30 - 8057 Zurich, steve.heinke@econ.uzh.ch.
Warmuth, Niels Jakob: Munich University of Technology, Arcisstrasse 21 - 80333 Munich,
niels.warmuth@wi.tum.de. Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Michael Allman, Marios Angele-
tos, Andreas Hefti, Josef Falkinger, Igor Letina, Sabrina Studer, Thomas Schmid, Christoph Ja¨ckel,
Christoph Kaserer, and to seminar participants at the Munich University of Technology, University of
Zurich, and the Zurich Workshop on Economics 2013 in Schaffhausen (Switzerland).
1
2 WORKING PAPER
I. Introduction
In a world of perfect markets, asset prices should fully reflect all available infor-
mation on the future cash flows associated with holding this asset (Fama, 1970).
Consequently, the riskiness of the asset ought to be the only factor a rational agent
takes into account when he makes his trading decision. Nowadays information is
available in massive amounts (Hefti and Heinke, 2015), but still the existence of
profitable trading strategies beside risk challenges the notions of market efficiency
and asset pricing based solely on rational expectation.1 Moreover, the existence
of funds spending vast amount of money on information processing and data min-
ing just to trade profitable on this informational advantage, underlines that the
availability of information alone is not the bottleneck when it comes to expecta-
tion formation. The abundance of information leads to a “scarcity of attention”
goes a long (Simon, 1955) and and the relevant question for an investor changes
to how to deal with this overwhelming amount of information. In other words, in
an information rich environment, attention to each piece of information becomes
a scarce resource.2
Two interlinked questions arise from the previous arguments:: First, why does
the efficient market hypothesis not always holds? Second, why do arbitrage op-
portunities exist? Theory based answers to these questions can be mainly divided
into two strands of the literature. The first deals with the question what hinders
rational arbitrageurs to take advantage of mispricing in the market and to equal-
ize them. Thus these concepts are mainly focused on institutional barriers.3 The
second strand investigates the specific nature of why agents fail to act fully ra-
tional. Common approaches are to assume special preferences4 or biased beliefs.5
While these approaches explain some of the empirically found anomalies, they
have the drawback that their set-up is somewhat ad-hoc and that empirical find-
ings tend to find a diminishing effect of most anomalies in the long run, which is
not implied by most of these models (Fama, 1998).
This paper gives an attention based answer to both questions, by combining the
concept of rational inattention (Sims, 1998, 2003, 2005) with the well developed
overlapping generation framework of asset pricing with heterogeneous informed
agents (Biais et al., 2010). We add heterogeneity among agents with respect to
signals and their information processing capacity constraints to a model of a dis-
aggregated economy with agents with an infinite horizon..
1See e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Hong et al. (2000) and Shleifer
(2000) for an overview on behavioral finance.
2See e.g. the models of Falkinger (2007, 2008); Hefti (2013) and for an overview Hefti and Heinke
(2015).
3An extensive review on these limits to arbitrage arguments can be found in Brunnermeier (2009).
4See e.g. Barberis et al. (2001)
5See among others Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998)
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Our first main finding stems from introducing uncertainty about the mean of
a dividend process. This allows us distinguish between long-term and short-term
factors of the assets dividend process.We study the influences of this distinction
on the equilibrium price and the attention allocation, as well as on how the in-
formation seep into the economy. This yields an explanation for the empirical
finding that shifts in the long-term fundamentals need time till they are fully
reflected in the price. This explains momentum trading strategies as an out-
come of rational actions for the price and that asset prices fully reflect changes
in fundamentals only in the long run. The second result of this paper follows
from allowing for heterogeneity in the information processing constraints. In this
framework we discuss how algorithmic and high-frequency traders turn their ca-
pability of processing enormous amounts of data into an informational advantage,
which generates excess returns. From a more general perspective, a similar ar-
gument can be used to explain the existence of financial services, since pooling
resources allows for specialization in information gathering and thus allows for a
more efficient use of the scarce resource attention capacities. This efficiency gain
can be expressed in terms of excess returns and thus justifies paying other people
to let them do the investment decision. The third finding is, that our model in
its basic form is supported by the data. In particular we discuss some trading
strategies of hedgefunds before the burst of the US sub prime bubble as an em-
pirical case study example of the more advanced form of our model. Moreover,
we argue that thinking the attention approach consequently through, the concept
of market efficiency and its testing by event-studies is contingent on the level of
attention on these event.
This study is nested on the overlap of two strands of the theoretical literature.
On the one hand we built on the concept of rational inattention in order to
model information acquisition and attention allocation. On the other hand we
use an overlapping generation framework which allows us to model information
aggregation processes within a competitive asset market. This short literature
review will give an overview on what rational inattention is about and portray
the overlapping generation models framework.
When it comes to modelling attention one has to keep in mind that the
attention of humans is driven by two fundamental psychological forces (Pashler,
1998). One possibility is that attention is directed on the affective level, also called
bottom-up or stimulus driven attention. In a newspaper based example this would
be the colour or font-size of the article, which draws the attention towards the
information. Another possible force is the cognitive aspect, also known as goal-
driven or top-down attention. In the newspaper example the color of font size does
not matter towards which information is processed, the only factor that matters
whether the subject is interested in this topic is the likely benefit to have the
information contained in the article. Usually both level interfere with each other,
and thus play a role in the process how the information enters the deliberation.
4 WORKING PAPER
Depending on the context of the decision to be made each aspect can be weighted
differently. Since asset pricing is a cognitive task and very different from impulsive
shopping for example we think that the rational inattention framework is the right
one in this case..
Models of rational inattention focus only on goal driven aspect of the attention
allocation processes. Thus the agent has an active role and full control when it
comes to decide which signal he receives (Hefti, 2013). Returning to the newspa-
per example consider a fund manager who is in charge of the investment decision.
Every morning he gets a newspaper and can decide on how much time he is going
to spend on reading the newspaper itself as well as on how much of this time he is
going to devote on the economics, finance, and politics section of this newspaper.
Suppose that the more of the newspaper he reads, the better will be his idea
of what is going on in the world and therefore he is more likely to make good
investment decision, but less spare time remains for doing other relevant tasks.
Given there is less time available than required to read the entire newspaper, he
faces the problem of how to allocate the given time over the different subsections
of the newspaper. For an investment decision reading the finance section might
be most relevant. Nevertheless, reading the politics or general economics section
might also be important since certain topics such as general economic policies,
decision on warfare, strikes and so on will be discussed there, which could po-
tentially matter for the investment decision as well. Under the assumption that
the investor knows the structure of his newspaper, he can judge the “average”
information potential of each section in advance, and thus decides rationally on
the allocation of a given time over the subsections as well as on the total reading
time by weighting the expected benefits of the optimal reading strategy against
the costs of doing something else. It is important to understand that the investor
allocates his given reading time, meaning his mental resources, only according to
the ex-ante expected information content of the subsections.6
Sims7, was among the first to formalize such an allocation problem, using the
concept of entropy8 as the measure of informativeness of a channel. In most
parts of the literature a channel is simply a signal that is correlated with the
future state of the world. DeOliveira et al. (2013) generalizes this idea by a
decision theoretic foundation. The whole problem itself can be seen as a two-stage
decision making process. In stage II the agent solves a standard utility maximizing
problem for any posterior distribution, meaning for any belief about the states
of the world. The objective of stage I is to choose the optimal channel/signal
that maximize the information value with respect to the subjective costs. In
our example the investor decides on his optimal trading strategy given some
allocation of time over the subsections of the newspaper in stage II. At stage I
6Hence the investor’s attention allocation is invariant to fancy headlines, pictures or report framing,
which would be the assumption of stimulus-driven attention models. See Hefti and Heinke (2015) for an
overview on models with stimulus driven attention, with a similar illustrative newspaper example.
7Sims (1998, 2003, 2005)
8From Shannon’s information theory
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he chooses overall reading time and attention allocation such that his expected
utility of choosing an investment plan is maximized, by weighting up the utility
costs of additional reading time against the marginal benefit of obtaining better
information, meaning a better posterior, on the state of the world and thus on the
prospects of his investment decision. Therefore the agent is totally rational in the
sense that he optimizes both over information acquisition and investment actions.
Due to the fact that information is subjectively costly, he will be inattentive to
information that is not ex-ante promising to be useful relative to information
costs. Most of the modelling done in rational inattention focuses on the variation
of the subjective cost function.9 Most of the literature mentioned above as well as
our model builds the subjective cost function on the information theoretic concept
of mutual information.10
The rational inattention approach has been applied to diverse macroeconomic
sub-fields such as sticky prices, see Sims (2003) and Woodford (2009), differences
in the price reactions due to different shocks, see Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2009) and Matejka and McKay (2012), understanding the forward discount puz-
zle of the uncovered interest rate parity condition, see Bacchetta and VanWincoop
(2005), business cycles, see Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), and consumption
choice with asymmetric responses to wealth shocks, see Tutino (2013), or in fi-
nance for studying portfolio allocation decision, see Peng (2005), understanding
home bias, see Mondria et al. (2010), sectoral instead of firm specific learning,
see Peng and Xiong (2006), and under diversification, see VanNieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2008). Other fields in economics where the rational inattention ap-
proach has been used are coordination games, see Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009),
and business studies by investigating a team production problem with task spe-
cialization resulting in an emergency of organizational leadership, see Dessein
et al. (2013).11
The overlapping generation framework is used within the field of asset
pricing mostly when one wants to discuss the information aggregation process as
Hellwig (1980) did in his seminal work in which he studied the implications for
the information contained in the price when each agent has a different piece of
information. He concluded that in large markets only the common element of
9See for example Hellwig et al. (2012) for a discussion on information choice technologies.
10The main idea behind mutual information is, that the agent wants to know more about the normally
distributed random variable X with variance σ2X , but can only observe the signal s, where X and s have
a multivariate normal distribution with conditional variance σ2
X|s of X. The unconditional entropy H(·)
of X is given by H(X) = 1
2
log2(2pieσ2X). This can be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty. The
conditional entropy of X after observing the signal s is H(X|s) = 1
2
log2(2pieσ2X|s). With these measures
at hand one can calculate the mutual information the signal s contains about the random variable X and
vice versa, by deducting the conditional entropy from the unconditional one I(X; s) = H(X)−H(X|s).
Equipped with the quantification of mutual information, limited attention capacities are modelled by a
bound κ on its per period average: I(X; s) ≤ κ
11Veldkamp (2011) is a comprehensive source for further applications of the rational inattention con-
cept.
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information that is known to many agents is reflected in the equilibrium price.
Apart from this the overlapping generations framework the agents interaction in
a market is explicitly modeld and specifically for the financial market this model
therefore represents a realistic approach. Biais et al. (2010) rely on these insights
and study the equilibrium prices and portfolio selection when there are agents
with asymmetric information sets in the market. Their setting the less informed
agents face a winners curse problem and has to take this into considerations when
deciding on the portfolio selection. Indexing fails and there are possibilities to
outperform the market.
We build on the frameworks of Biais et al. (2010) and Sims (1998), since we are
interested in heterogeneous informed agents and their information choices, how
these choices affect asset prices, and how agents interact with each other. The
resulting model incorporates heterogeneity of agents in two ways, at first in the
information capacity constraint of each agent and second in the signal itself. We
take advantage of both features of the model and are able to derive interesting
results showing that attention is a relevant factor when one wants to understand
anomalies in asset price dynamics within a competitive market.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Section II introduces the simplest
versions of our model and theoretical framework highlighting the basic mecha-
nisms behind it. Subsequently, in section III, we extend the basic version of the
model to provide testable implications with respect to market efficiency and to
incorporate shifts in our framework. Section IV discusses the model with hetero-
geneous agents. Section V concludes.
II. Model
Consider an economy with N assets and the dividend flow of each asset n ∈ N
follows a stochastic process with a deterministic mean µn and variance σ
2
n. Thus
the dividend stream can be described by,
dn,t = µn + σnnt,(1)
where nt ∼ N(0, 1) represents the normally distributed random component, with
mean 0 and variance 1. In each period t the old generation t − 1 is already in
the economy owning the assets and a new generation t is born consisting of a
continuum of identical agents distributed uniformly on the unit interval with a
constant population mass of one. The agents of generation t can buy the asset and
earn the dividend, which will be left from paying for the assets can be consumed.
In the next period t + 1 generation t resells the asset and consume the received
cash. Thus owning an asset means saving for the second period consumption.
Before buying the asset, a member of generation t can only receive noisy signals
about the dividends by informing themselves. Since they are limited by their
information processing capabilities they have to decide on how thoroughly they
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want inform themselves, meaning how noisy the signal for each asset should be.
This implies the following order of events (see figure 1). Each agent i ∈ [0, 1] of
the young generation t first decides how to allocate his attention, then he receives
his information on the dividends in period t and decides on his trading strategy
qit+1. After this trading takes place, while the old generation t − 1 will sell all
its assets to finance their consumption in period t, the young generation t will
buy the assets in order so save for consumption in its second period. The prices
clear markets. Finally, the dividend realizes and the residual of dividends less
payments for the bought assets will be consumed. In period t+ 1 generation t−1
leaves the economy, generation t will be the old generation and a new generation
t+ 1 is born, repeating the procedure above.
Figure 1. Timing of Events
Generation t
t
A1
ρd1,s1
...
ρdN ,sN
N1
s1t
...
sNt
A2
q1,t+1
...
qN,t+1
N2
d1t...
dNt
A3
ct
A4
ct+1
t+1
Generation t+1
A1
ρd1,s1
...
ρdN ,sN
N1
s1t+1
...
sNt+1
A2
q1,t+2
...
qN,t+2
N2
d1t+2
...
dNt+2
A3
ct+1
A4
ct+2
Graphically representation of timing of events in this the overlapping generation framework. The life of
generation t and t+1 are represented by the two time lines. A1,2,3,4 mark events where the generation
has to take an action or make a decision. N1,2 stand for an occurrence by nature. snt stands for the
signal belonging to asset n in time period t. ρdn,sn is the correlation between signal n and dividend of
asset n. qnt+1 is the number of asset n hold from period t to period t+1. ct and ct+1 are the
consumptions associated with the investment in period t and t+1 for generation t.
The signal structure of asset n in period t agent i chooses to observe is taken
from the set of all possible signal structures Γ and consists of the future dividend,
equation (1), plus noise σ˜inψ
i
nt, where σ˜
i
n is the scaling parameter of the noise
and ψint is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. The signal precision
is a function of the amount of information contained in the signal about the
dividend, measured by the average mutual information the signal contains about
the dividend. Since the agent i only has limited capacities to process information,
there exists an upper bound κi on the amount of information processed I(·). Thus
κi can be thought of as the maximum information processing capacity. We will
refer to (3) as information processing constraint.
sin,t = µn + σnnt + σ˜
i
nψ
i
nt(2)
I
({dt} ;{sit}) ≤ κi(3)
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Where sit is the vector of all signals chosen by agent i and dt is the vector of the
stochastic processes of all assets’ dividends. The agent’s inter-temporal rate of
substitution is given by β.
With this notation at hand one can describe the two-stage decision problem of
the agent:
max
sit∈Γ
E
[
u(cit; s
i
t) + βu(c
i
t+1; s
i
t)s
i
t
]
(4)
subject to the following constraints
I
({dt} ;{sit}) ≤ κi(5)
qi∗t+1 = arg max
qit+1
E
[
u(cit; s
i
t) + βu(c
i
t+1; s
i
t)s
i
t
]
(6)
cit = q
i∗
t+1 (dt − pt)(7)
cit+1 = q
i∗
t+1pt+1(8)
In the first stage (4) the agent decides on the signal structure he wants to receive
taking his information processing constraint (5) into account. In the second stage
he decides on his trading strategy (6) given the received signal of the chosen
structure and the budget constraints (7) and (8).
Note that in this framework agent i decides on the level of precision of the signal
sit ∈ Γ and not a specific signal itself. Furthermore, following Sims (2003) and
using Shannon entropy as an information measure implies that the precision level
of a signal can be translated into the correlation between dividend and signal.
Proposition 1. Information Capacity Constraint
Given independent dividends and signals the information capacity constraint (3)
can be written as:
(9)
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ1
+
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ22
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ2
....+
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2N
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κN
≤ κ
Where ρn is the chosen correlation parameter between asset n’s dividend and the
corresponding signal.
Proof: See section VII.A.
Solving the agent’s decision problem one has to start at the second stage, finding
the market price dependent on the signals received. Here we assume that the
agents are identical and thus each generation can be represented by on singel
agent, we relax this assumption the course of this paper. Together with the market
clearing condition, one can derive the market price analogously to Lucas Jr (1978).
Having a solution for the market price depended on the structure of the signals,
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the first stage of the problem can be addressed by weighting the usefulness of a
more precise signal for one asset against less precise signals for all other assets
and thus solving the attention allocation problem.
A. Two Assets and One Agent Group
This section introduces the simplest case of our model in order to get some
intuition towards the approach and the equilibrium. The results are similar to
the ones when using a Lucas tree model such as Peng (2005) or Luo and Young
(2010). Thus, while this part does not add new insights, there are some interesting
implications gained on the way of getting there.
We assume the case of an economy with two risky assets, think of them as
shares in a company, bonds or a portfolio of financial products, and one group of
homogeneous agents with mean-variance utility, see Biais et al. (2010):
u(c) = E [c]− γ
2
V ar [c](10)
u(c; s) = E [c|s]− γ
2
V ar [c|s](11)
Since we have Baysian-Agents, in equilibrium they weight between their prior
information, µ, and the information received by the signal. The weights are
determined by how noisy or informative the signals are, thus the more informative,
less noisy, a signal is, the more weight the agent will put on this signal. Therefore
the signal choice influences the expected value of the asset and thus the market
clearing price, as can be seen in equation (12). Also note, that the less informative
the signal, the higher will be A and thus the higher will be the risk-premia. Thus
a lack of information processing capacities leads to noisy information and higher
risk-premia, pressing the prices.
pt = Ξ
2 · (st − µ) + µ
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(12)
Ξ is the diagonal matrix of optimal correlations ρ∗n and A the variance of future
dividends and prices:
(13) A =
(
σ21(1− ρ∗21 ) + βσ21ρ∗21
σ22(1− ρ∗22 ) + βσ22ρ∗22
)
Once the reaction of the market price towards changes in the information choice
is clear, the agent can solve the attention allocation, leading to the following
solution, proposition (2) is about.
Proposition 2. Attention allocation in the Two Asset Case
The optimal attention allocation structure, meaning the desired signal precision,
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which depends on the variance ratio of both dividend processes κ = σ1σ2 , as:
(14) ρ∗1 =

√
1− (14)κ if κ2 > 4κ√
1− 1κ
(
1
2
)κ
if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]
0 if κ2 < 14κ
(15) ρ∗2 =

0 if κ2 > 4κ√
1− κ (12)κ if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]√
1− (14)κ if κ2 < 14κ
Proof: See Appendix (VII.B)
Assuming that one asset has a lower variance than the other, proposition 2
states that the agent will allocate more attention on tracking the more risky asset
(i.e. the more volatile one), since the gain in utility by eliminating uncertainty
is higher with this asset. The larger the differences in the variance and the lower
the information processing capacity κ the more available attention is allocated to
the asset with the higher variance.12 Under the information processing constraint
allocated attention becomes valuable. The value of the information processing
capacity can be measured by the expected excess price the agent group attributes
to the asset under the information processing constraint κ as compared to the
uninformed state. Lets demonstrate this by having a look at one of the corner
solution, where κ2 > 4κ, collapsing to the one asset case.13 Than ρ∗2 is directly
given by
ρ∗21 = 1−
1
4κ
:= α (κ(t))(16)
Taking expectations of the price in the case without any signal:
E[p] =
µ− γσ2
1− β(17)
Doing the same in the constrained case with a binding information processing
constraint (3):
E[p] =
µ− γσ2
1− β + γ
(
1− 1
4κ
)
σ2(18)
12An numerical solution for the N asset case by an approximation of the resulting boundary conditions
will be discussed in section VII.F.
13Could also be κ2 < 1
4κ
.
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The excess value is bounded by γσ2 and we can define the relative excess value
X(·), meaning which part of the maximal excess value is achieved. Defining the
excess value as a function of κ leads to:
X(κ) = γσ2
(
1− 1
4κ
)
(19)
For the inner solutions, thus the actual two asset case the excess value of infor-
mation is:
X(κ) = 2γ
((
1− σ2
σ1
√
1
4κ
)
σ21 +
(
1− σ1
σ2
√
1
4κ
)
σ22
)
(20)
= 2γ
(
σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2σ1σ2
√
1
4κ
)
(21)
The upper bound is given by 2γ
(
σ21 + σ
2
2
)
. Obviously this excess value is struc-
turally different to the one asset case. On the one hand both variances come
naturally into play, but there is also a punishment term, reflecting the trade-off
between the attention towards both assets. In the symmetric case σ1 = σ2 the
excess value becomes:
X(κ) = 4γσ2
(
1− 1
4κ
)
(22)
The value of information processing capacity will get more important later on,
when having the possibility to interact with other agent groups and the value can
be implemented to actual gains and not only increases in utility reflected by the
asset price. For now it is enough to point out the definitive value of information
processing capacity within our model.
B. Heterogeneous Informed Agents
Allowing for heterogeneity in the information leads to groups of agents, who
receive different signals, but are otherwise identical. Which leads to derive first
testable empirical hypotheses in the next step.
Proposition 3. Price Variance
Assume that there are G equally large groups of agents with independent signals
and one asset in the economy, then the price formula is given by:
pt = ρ
∗2
 1
G
G∑
g=1
sgt − µ
+ µ
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(23)
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with
(24) A = σ2(1− ρ∗2) + β
(
σ2 +
1
G
σ˜2
)
ρ∗4
Consequently the variance of the price of the first asset can be written as:
V ar (pt) =
(
σ2 +
1
G
σ˜2
)
ρ∗4(25)
Proof: See section VII.C.
Proposition 3 directly links the price variance of an asset to the variance of the
underlying dividend process, the attention allocated on the asset, and the number
of independent signals, meaning the number of different agent groups G.
For heterogeneous informed market participants, meaning a very high G, the
volatility of an asset price depends only on the variance of the dividend and the
attention allocation, given a not too small attention allocation and thus not a too
big signal variance. On the other hand, if the number of heterogeneous informed
groups G decreases the variance of the price increases, as long as the information
processing capacity stays constant. This is intuitive plausible, since the more
different agents are in the market, the likelihood is higher, that new information
enters the market, which reduces the likelihood of an shock due to not perceived
information.
C. A First Empirical Test to the Model
In a next step we will rewrite our model in a time series regression form in
order to fit it to data later on. Assuming a large G, which should be the case
when looking at an highly liquid asset or basket of assets, the 1G σ˜
2 term becomes
insignificantly small:
V ar (pt) = σ
2ρ∗4(26)
To bring the model to the data one has further to assume an exogenously given
attention allocation, since there is no possibility to solve the attention allocation
problem without knowing κ, the number of possible sources of risk, and their
fundamental variance. Taking the root and replacing the correlation of the sig-
nal with the fundamental ρ∗2 by α (κ (t)), see (16), as well as introducing time
dependency leads to the following form of the model:
σ (pt) (t) = σα (κ (t))(27)
As our asset we chose the S&P 500 index and a reasonable choice for an exoge-
nously given attention allocation measure on the S&P 500 would be the Google
Investing Index (GII), which captures all finance related Google searches in the
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US. Since we are not interested in the S&P 500 itself but in its instantaneous
volatility, we take the VIX S&P 500 implied volatility index as a proxy. Fur-
thermore we assume GII(t) ∼ α(κ(t)) with a coefficient of proportionality of χ
and normalize all values.14 For our regression we take daily data from September
23rd, 2008 until September 23rd, 2013. This is equal to 1282 observations. The
VIX S&P 500 is obtained from Datastream and the Google Investing Index from
the Google website.15
Figure 2. S&P 500 Volatility and Google Investing Index
Figure 2 shows the VIX S&P500 implied volatility index (Datastream) and the Google Investing Index
(Google Finance), normalized by subtracting 0.38, during the time from September 23rd, 2008 until
September 23rd, 2013. The number of observations is 1282. Further the resulting fit of the
corresponding linear regression is shown, as well as it’s 95% confidence bounds. The results of the
regression are portrayed in table 1.
If the attention measured by the Google Investing Index would be irrelevant
one would see a symmetric cloud and an insignificant regression coefficient χ. As
figure 2 and our regression analysis show this is not the case. We find an adjusted
R2 value of 0.55 and a regression coefficient for the Google Investing Index sig-
nificant at the 1% level as well as a very high F-statistic of 159 of our model.16
Looking at these results the first question, which comes to mind, is of course
causality. Since the Google Investing Index is only available as a seven day’s
average, it consists mostly of data prior to the VIX S&P 500 volatility index.
Normally the next step towards determining causality would be a test of Granger
causality, which unfortunately is not feasible in this particular case, since the
14The normalization is performed by subtracting 0.38, which makes the intercept in the later on
performed regression approximately zero. Since we not know the absolute level of attention at any time
and only assume relative changes, setting the intercept to zero is a valid normalization choice.
15http://www.google.com/finance?cid=2001035, viewed September 23rd, 2013
16The results of this regression should be interpreted with care, since the underlying time series are
non-stationary, which might lead to a spurious regression analysis. Given the long-term mean reversion
character of volatility and the Google Investing Index it should however not be a critical issue in this
case.
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underlying time series are non-stationary and the Google Investing Index’s first
difference process is quasi discrete. However, Da et al. (2011) show using Google
search data on Bloomberg stock ticker numbers that Google search volume leads
other attention measures, such as extreme returns or news. Other studies indicate
in the same direction, e.g. Preis et al. (2013) provide evidence for the predictive
power of changes in Google search volume and Moat et al. (2013) show the num-
bers of readers of Wikipedia articles related to financial topics are “early warning
signs” for stock markets moves. Thus it is quiet save to assume causality to go
the way from attention to volatility and not the other way around.
Table 1—S&P 500 Volatility and Google Investing Index
σ (S&P500) (t) Intercept χ adj. R2
∼ GII (t) 0.09 66.17*** 0.55
This table shows the results of the time series regression of the VIX S&P 500 implied volatility index
on the normalised Google Investing Index. The observation period is consisting of 1282 observations
from September 23rd, 2008 until September 23rd, 2013. Statistical significance is indicated by *, **,
and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. The intercept value is a result of the normalisation
process and should not be interpreted in this regression. The corresponding F-statistic of the model
against the constant model is 159.
There are three major implications towards how information travels in financial
markets and how efficiently it is incorporated into the price from these findings.
First (1), the information flow, which is represented by the signals in our model,
appears to be limited by the capacity to process information and by how much
attention or information processing capacity is spent on a particular source of
uncertainty measured by the Google Investing Index. Second (2), this clearly
contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, at least in the semi-strong and strong
form, see Fama (1970). According to the efficient market hypothesis all publicly
available information should always be rapidly incorporated into the price and
thus there should be no relationship between Google search volume and volatility.
It appears however that the attention to the information is relevant, not just its
availability. Finally (3), information is incorporated efficiently into the price if the
allocated information processing capacity is sufficiently high. Consequently, the
market is supposed to be efficient during repeated events, which make information
available like for example earning announcements. In sum this implies that testing
for market efficiency in an event study context as pioneered by Fama et al. (1969)
is problematic, since one is testing market efficiency of processing information
conditional on the level of attention allocation. Thus, rephrasing it, such an
event study picks situations, during which information is better processed than
in normal times, since attention allocation is high during such events, in order to
proof that information is incorporated into the asset prices by financial markets
efficiently in general.
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III. One Asset with Shift
The last section dealt with how much available information is actually incorpo-
rated into the price and how this depends on the information processing capacity
allocated to this task. The natural follow-up question is on how does information
travel into the market price. To answer this question we use the inter-temporal
nature of our framework by introducing shifts in fundamentals of the dividend
process and fanalyzing when they are reflected in asset prices. Specifically, we
look at the behaviour of an asset from the end of one equilibrium state given by
an exogenous shock in the long-term mean of the dividend process till the next
shock. Thus we augment our model by a shift µ˜ in the fundamental dividend
process, which is distributed normally with mean µ0 and variance σ
2
2. The agent
receives two signals, one about the dividend itself s1t and one about the shift in
the mean s2t. Thus the dividend and signal processes look as follows:
d1t = µ+ σ11t + µ˜(28)
µ˜ = N(µ0, σ
2
2)(29)
s1t = µ1 + σ11t + σ˜1ψ1t(30)
s2t = µ˜+ σ˜2ψ2t(31)
All noise terms are independent of each other and the correlations, ρ1 and ρ2, of d1
with s1t and µ˜ with s2t depend only on the variance of the additional noise terms.
The best guess of the agent about µ˜ is denoted with µt, which is the weighted
mean between the agent’s signal on the mean s2t and his previous guess µt−1, thus
µt = ρ
2
2s2t + (1 − ρ22)µt−1. To ensure a stationary problem and since the agent
does not know if a shift has occurred every generation assumes its information
about µ˜ to have variance σ22, meaning the same quality.
Proposition 4. Attention Allocation with Shift
If there is only one asset with a shift in the mean of the dividend process and one
agent group with mean-variance utility, the price for the asset is given by:
pt = ρ
∗2
1 (s1t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(32)
The variance is given by:
A = σ21(1− ρ∗21 ) +
σ22
(1− β)2 (1− ρ
∗2
2 ) + βσ
2
1ρ
∗2
1 +
β
(1− β)2 ρ
∗2
2 σ
2
2(33)
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This implies the attention allocation:
(34) ρ∗1 =

√
1− (14)κ if κ2 > 4κ√
1− 1κ
(
1
2
)κ
if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]
0 if κ2 < 14κ
(35) ρ∗2 =

0 if κ2 > 4κ√
1− κ (12)κ if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]√
1− (14)κ if κ2 < 14κ
with κ = σ1σ2 (1− β).
Proof: See section VII.D.
The main difference to the model without a shift is that the attention allocation
does not only depend on the signal to noise ratio any more. The time preference
also influences the attention allocation on the long-term dividend mean or on the
dividend today. The less the agent is concerned about tomorrow, meaning the
lower the β, the less he focuses on the mean shift. At this point it needs to be
stressed that a constant β over all generations is assumed.
Proposition 5. Intertemporal Attention Allocation
The attention allocation varies with the time preferences β. The higher β the
lower will be the attention on the short-term component ρ∗1 and the higher will be
the attention on the long-term component ρ∗2.
Proof: The proposition follows immediately from κ = σ1σ2 (1− β) and its influ-
ence on the allocation scheme.
A. Simulation and Empirical Evidence of the Shift Model
The partial neglect of the fundamentals leads to a lacked adjustment towards
the new equilibrium. Figure 3 shows one simulated sample price path, where the
shift, µ˜ = −2, in period T is considerably large. The simulation was performed in
Matlab using β = 0.9, γ = 0.2, κ = 0.09, µ = 25, µ0 = 0, σ
2
1 = 10, and σ
2
2 = 0.1 as
the underlying market parameters. Since σ1σ2 (1 − β) = 1 the attention is equally
distributed in this case. For the sake of simplicity we will choose the model
specification always in such a manner, that attention is allocated equally between
the long- and short-term sources of uncertainty when performing simulations.
One can see that the adjustment time of the price shown in figure 3 is con-
siderably long. Obviously the two factors most important for determining the
adjustment time are the size of the shift and the information processing capac-
ity κ. To give an overview of the interdependencies of these three variables we
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Figure 3. Sample Path of a Shift
Figure 3 shows one sample path of a simulated asset price during a shift. The period of the shift is
t = 0. The whole graph was simulated with T = 0, β = 0.9, γ = 0.2, κ = 0.09, µ = 25, µ0 = 0, σ21 = 10,
σ22 = 0.1, and µ˜ = −2 as the underlying market parameters.17
perform a sensitivity analysis of the adjustment time as a function of the in-
formation processing capacity and the shock in the long-term mean of the un-
derlying dividend process. Figure VI.A in the appendix shows this analysis for
κ ∈ {0.10, 0.11, ..., 0.20} and µ˜ ∈ {1.0, 1.5, ..., 6.0}, measured in standard devia-
tions σ2. The adjustment time is given by the mean adjustment time over 10000
Monte Carlo simulations at each node and defined as the time it takes the price to
reach its new theoretical long-term mean for the first time after the shift occurred.
Looking at figure VI.A one can see an overproportional increase in the adjustment
time with lower information capacity κ and an underproportional increase with
shift size.
Having illustrated the properties of our model by two simulation studies we turn
now to an empirical example. Perhaps the best example data-wise of our model is
the burst of the US subprime bubble, since it represents a major shift in an asset
price during a period for which Google search data is available. Figure 4 shows
the Case-Shiller Home Price 20 City Composite index and the cumulative Google
Trend search results of “subprime” in the period of January 2006 to December
2011. The Case-Shiller Home Price 20 City Composite is an index of the home
prices of the 20 major metropolitan areas in the US. The index is published
monthly by Standard & Poor’s. It uses the Karl Case and Robert Shiller method
of a house price index, which is a modified version of the weighted repeat sales
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methodology.18 The cumulative Google Trend search results of “subprime” were
directly obtained from Google Trend.19 Since there exists a base rate of non-
financial related searches for “subprime” only each monthly value in excess of the
long-term sample mean of 12 in the original measure of Google Trends were used.
As one can see, the increase in Google search volume for “subprime” presides
Figure 4. Case-Shiller Home Price Index and Google Trend Search “Subprime”
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Figure 4 shows the Case-Shiller Home Price 20 City Composite index (left axis) with January 2006 as
basis 100 and the cumulative Google Trend search results for “subprime” (right axis) with its December
2011 set to 1. The data of the Case-Shiller index is obtained from Datastream. The cumulative Google
Trend search results of “subprime” were directly obtained from Google Trend. Since there exists a base
rate of non financial related searches for “subprime” each monthly value in excess of the long-term
sample mean of 12 in the original measure of Google Trend was used.
the major downturn in the second half of 2007 in the Case-Shiller Home Price
Index. During the price correction more and more available information about the
housing market is absorbed by market participants informing themselves, which
is measured by the number of cumulative Google searches for this topic. This
also implies that traders with an informational advantage could gain a lot out
of their obtained information. We will return to this question in section IV.B,
where we explicitly model a market of heterogeneous agents with respect to their
information processing capacity constraint during a shift. Going back to the
question of how efficient information is processed by the market, the burst of the
subprime bubble is a good example for this not being the case and how it takes
a long time for the information to spread as more and more market participants
18http://www.spindices.com/index-family/real-estate/sp-case-shiller, viewed September 25th, 2013
19http://www.google.de/trends/, viewed September 23rd, 2013
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inform themselves about the underlying situation. It is important to point out
again that only singular events can provide evidence toward market inefficiencies
as discussed in section II.B.
B. Implications for the Momentum Effect
As the simulation in figure (3) shows, the model generate phases of uniformly
positive or negative expected earnings in excess of dividends, which can be seen as
excess returns and are empirically resembled by a phase of autocorrelation. This
pattern is a necessary requirement for a momentum effect (Biais et al., 2010).
Figure (5) elaborates this notion of correlated excess returns during a shift in a
simulation of our model. The autocorrelation of the full sample is close to zero.
But during the transition phase from period 100 till period 125 the autocorrelation
is substantially higher with 0.24.
Figure 5. Momentum Trading
Figure 5 shows the asset sample path, with a positive shift in the long-term mean of the dividend
process in period 100. The graph below shows the excess returns, meaning the returns in excess of
dividends. β = 0.9, γ = 0.2, κ1 = 0.20, κ2 = 0.25, µ = 10, σ21 = 5, σ
2
2 = 0.05, and µ˜ = 2 are the
parameters of the underlying market. The autocorrelation of the excess returns over the full sample is
-0.08 and 0.24 during the shift from period 100 till period 125.
Proposition 6. Momentum Effect
During a shift, meaning a phase of length τ ∈ N with µ˜ < µt+i or µ˜ > µt+i ∀i ≤ τ ,
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the expected excess return under an extended outsider information set20 is either
uniformly positive or negative.
Proof: See section VII.E.
The intuition is that during a positive (negative) shift, the expected excess re-
turn conditional on the shift, meaning if the agent knows that there has been a
shift, is also positive (negative). This means that there is a statistical autocor-
relation if one looks ex-post at the data, but ex-ante, in the moment the agent
has to decide how to invest, the agent cannot be sure about the shift and its size
since its only source of information is the signal he receives. Consequently, the
agent is not able to take advantage of this momentum trading opportunity on a
single asset.21
IV. Investors with Different Information Processing Capabilities
On the financial market the participants differ in their infrastructure and ex-
pertise on interpreting available data of a financial services provider, particu-
larly when one compares investment banks with an amateur investor. In this
view the financial services industry is a seller of information processing capacity
when offering products to non-professional investors. Another example is from
within professional trading, where computer models and algorithms are taking
over more and more human decision making. For example high-frequency traders
are involved in almost 70% of all dollar volume trades, see Brogaard (2010). The
reasons for this development are simple, the hard- and software used for high
frequency trading can process more information in a shorter time as compared
to a human. Such advantages in information processing leads to higher precision
of the information or to a time advantage. Within our framework we can discuss
these processing advantages by allowing for different information processing ca-
pacity constraint and show how this affects the optimal asset allocation and the
returns for different agent groups.
A. Two Assets and Two Types of Agents
We add to the simplest case of a two assets economy as described in section
II.A two possible types of agents differing from each other by their information
processing capabilities.
Proposition 7. Let the fraction of group one with information processing con-
straint κ1 be λ. Its information allocation will be denoted by ρ11 and ρ12. The
20The extended outside information set includes the information that a shift is happening, which of
course is no information the agent could obtain from only taking into account the signals he receives.
21Leaving the scope of our model and assuming an economy with many assets, which are partly
shifting at any given time, one would be able to exploit these autocorrelations with an momentum
trading strategy, even though one does not know if any particular asset is really shifting or not.
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same applies for group two with an information processing constraint κ2, repre-
senting a fraction of the population of 1− λ and an information allocation of ρ21
and ρ22. Then the quantities hold in equilibrium are:
q∗1 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1(
Ξ21 · (s1t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(36)
q∗2 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A2 + A˜
)−1(
Ξ22 · (s2t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(37)
A1 and A2 are the variances associated with the dividends for each of the investor
groups and A˜ the variances of future prices. The price of the assets are thus given
by:
pt =
µ
1− β + ω
(
Ξ21 · (s1t − µ)
)
+ (1− ω) (Ξ22 · (s2t − µ))− Ω1(38)
with
ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1 λτ1(39)
Ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1(40)
Proof: See Appendix VII.G for detailed derivation.
Economically ω represents the fact that λ needs to be adjusted for the average
informativeness of the signal of the agent group, since a more precise informed
group will trade more in the market as compared to a less informed group of
the same size. Figure 6 shows the asset allocation and the cumulative excess
returns, meaning the cumulative returns in excess of dividends normalised by
group size, for each of the two agent group with different information processing
capacities. The simulation parameters of figure 6 differ only in the relative size
λ of agent group one, which has a higher information processing capacity. This
shows that for the group with a higher information processing capacity constraint
the value of κ depends on their own fraction on the whole population of agents.
Thus the smaller the group of fast learners is the higher is their excess return
(standardized by the group size). This simply reflects the fact, that the group
with better information processing capacity constraints faces less competition on
information the smaller they are, thus the higher will be the margin for each
individual trader.
Due to the more complex and semi-analytical character of the heterogeneous
model on the one hand and the different character of the money equivalent of
the information processing capacity it is not possible to quantify the value of
information processing capacity in a similar manner as in the baseline model, see
equations (19) and (22). Specifically, in the base line model the implicit ex-ante
gain in utility was presented while in the heterogeneous model ex-post excess
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returns are analyzed.
Figure 6. Value of Information Processing Capacity
This figure shows the cumulative excess return standardized by group size and the asset allocation of
the first asset of two equally big agent groups (upper row, λ = 0.5) and of two differently big agent
groups (lower row, λ = 0.1) with different information processing capacities trading on two assets. The
parameters of the underlying market are taken as β = 0.9, γ = 0.5, λ = 0.5, κ1 = 0.45, κ2 = 0.25,
µ1,2 = 10, σ21,2 = 4. The length of the simulation is 300 time periods.
B. One Asset with Shift and Two Types of Agents
Instead of having two asset to concentrate on, one can also ask the question
regarding two different kind of shocks on the same asset, as we did before in
section (III) and exploied the intertemporal framework to discuss such coups like
the successful bet of John Paulson on the burst of the subprime bubble of the
US housing market from an informational processing and attention allocation
point of view. Abstracting from the individual case one can interpret it as an
informational advantage from a higher information processing constraint within
the environment of a shock in the fundamentals. Model-wise we add to our
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model of section III two groups of agents with different information processing
constraints.
Proposition 8. In addition to proposition (7), each group of agents has now
current beliefs µ1t, µ2t of the long-term mean, which they update every period.
This allows for heterogeneity in the dynamics in the long-term mean expectations.
The optimal asset allocation of both groups is given by:
q∗1 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
(41) (
ρ∗21 (s11t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s12t − µt) + µ+ µ1t
1− β − pt
)
q∗2 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A2 + A˜
)−1
(42) (
ρ∗21 (s21t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s22t − µt) + µ+ µ2t
1− β − pt
)
Using the same notational short cuts as before the price will be:
pt = ω
(
ρ∗21 (s11t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s12t − µt) + µ+ µ1t
1− β
)
(43)
+ (1− ω)
(
ρ∗21 (s21t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s22t − µt) + µ+ µ2t
1− β
)
−Ω1
with
ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1 λτ1(44)
Ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1(45)
Proof: For detailed derivation see Appendix (VII.H).
Having derived the model we now want to compare its implications, which we
portray with the help of a simulation case study, with the bet of John Paulson on
the burst of the US housing market bubble. Figure 7 shows a simulation of the
most extreme case, meaning a small group with a high information processing
capacity and a large group with a very small information processing capacity
constraint. As one can see, both groups trade in opposite directions as most of
the future value of the asset is wiped out by a shock in period 5. While the group
with a high information processing capacity constraint shortens the asset, the
other one is buying it, since it is not yet aware of the sharp drop.
By shorting his exposure to BBB tranches of subprime mortgage backed securities
using credit default swaps John Paulson was able to reap a huge profit when the
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US housing market declined sharply in 2007/2008 and many of the BBB tranches
lost all their value. That this was not just a lucky guess, but actually a model
example of an agent having a huge advantage in information processing capacity
can be seen by the fact that “John Paulson [...] purchased the best database on
house-price statistics, commissioned a technology company to help him warehouse
it, and hired extra analysts to interpret the numbers”.22 Wanting to trade on what
he perceived as the greatest weakness of the US financial system he allocated a
lot of information processing capacity on the US housing market, as one can
see from his investments, and was therefore able to exploit the informational
advantage during the burst of the bubble. Even though he earned more than $15
billions with this strategy in the end, he lost millions of dollars on the way, since
it took a while till the prices dropped finally in 2007/2008.23
22Mallaby (2010), p. 386
23For an in-depth discussion of John Paulson’s trade see Mallaby (2010), p. 307-391.
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Figure 7. Heterogeneous Information Processing Capacities and Shift
Figure 7 shows the cumulative excess return and the asset allocation, standardized by group size, of each agent group and the dynamics of the price of
the shifted asset. The simulation time is 60 periods with a shock in period 5, which wipes out most of the assets fundamental value. The model
parameters used for the simulation are β = 0.9, γ = 0.2, λ = 0.05, κ1 = 0.5, κ2 = 0.01, µ = 20, µ0,1 = 0, µ0,2 = 0, σ21 = 4, σ
2
2 = 0.04, µ˜ = −15.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a model of rational inattention with an overlap-
ping generation model for the financial market. To the best of our knowledge
we are the first to combine rational inattention with a real market model and
to derive implications towards competitive attention allocation and the choice
between short-term and long-term relevant information from it. Going on from
these mostly theoretical results we derived the following four main implications
from our model. First (1), we have shown and empirically tested that the capabil-
ity to process information and the willingness to allocate this capability towards a
specific source of uncertainty is highly relevant in the context of how information
travels in the financial market. Thus we challenged the efficient market hypoth-
esis by an alternative framework of attention driven efficiency. Given the idea of
attention driven efficiency, we further pointed out that it might be problematic
to test market efficiency in general during times of high allocated attention, since
the market should be efficient during these times. Second (2), extending our ba-
sic model by a shift component, we showed how shifts can be seen as a result
of limited information processing capacity while still staying in a rational agent
framework. Furthermore, we portrayed the plausibility of this concept with an
empirical case study of the burst of the US subprime bubble and John Paulson’s
successful bet on it. Third (3), within this shift framework, we were able to give
a micro-level explanation of the momentum effect in a rational agent framework
without direct arbitrage opportunities. Fourth (4), we have shown that within
our framework financial services providers can be seen as providers of information
processing capacity.
Since this is the first rational inattention model developed to explicitly model
information aggregation on the financial market, we believe that there is still
a huge potential for other possible applications. Further, there should be am-
ple opportunity to extend and improve on the suggested model. Perhaps most
prominently the question of making information available to other parties is not
addressed within our model context and would be the most interesting extension
of our framework.
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VI. Appendix
A. Figure on Adjustment Time Depended on κ and the Shift Size
Figure VI.A shows the mean adjustment time, meaning the time starting from when the shock happened until the price reaches the new theoretically
implied long-term mean level for the first time. The graph presents the mean adjustment time of 10000 Monte Carlo simulations at each node using
T = 0, β = 0.9, γ = 0.5, µ = 20, µ0 = 0, σ21 = 10, and σ
2
2 = 0.1 as the underlying market parameters.
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VII. Mathematical Proofs
A. Proof of Proposition 1
If two normally distributed random variables X and Y are correlated with each
other with correlation parameter ρ the mutual information, meaning the infor-
mation one variable contains about the other, can be expressed as the reduction
in the entropy of X by observing the other random variable Y .
(46) I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(XY )
H(X) is the unconditional entropy of X and H(XY ) is the conditional entropy
of the X given Y . Both can be calculated using the entropy formula:
H(X) =
1
2
log2
[
(2pie)T det ΩX
]
(47)
H (XY ) =
1
2
log2
[
(2pie)T det ΩXY
]
(48)
If X,Y are jointly multivariate normal distributed with Cov(Xi, Xj) = 0 ∀i 6= j,
Cov(Yi, Yj) = 0 ∀i 6= j, Cov(Xi, Yj) = ρσXσY ∀i = j, Cov(Xi, Yj) = 0 ∀i 6= j,
V ar(Xi) = σ
2
X , and V ar(Yi) = σ
2
Y the mutual information (46) can also be
written in the following way:
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(XY )(49)
=
1
2
log2
[
(2pie)Tσ2TX
]− 1
2
log2
[
(2pie)T
(
σ2X − σ2Xρ2
)T ]
(50)
=
1
2
T log2
(
1
1− ρ2
)
(51)
Since we are interested in the average information per period, we divide (51) by
T :
I(Xt, Yt) =
1
T
1
2
T log2
(
1
1− ρ2
)
(52)
=
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2
)
(53)
In our case the dividends are independent, as well as the signals. Therefore one
can think of independent information processes for each asset and simply take
the sum of the amount of information in the given period:
(54)
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ21
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ1
+
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ22
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ2
....+
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ρ2N
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κN
≤ κ
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
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: The solution to this problem is derived in four steps. The first step
derives the asset demand, the second step solves for the market clearing price, the
third step simplifies the attention allocation problem, and the fourth step finally
solves the attention allocation problem.
Step 1: The market clearing price can be derived from the solution of (6) given
an optimal attention allocation and the received signals st. The corresponding
FOC (first order condition) is given by:
0 = E [dt|st] + βE [pt+1|st]− pt − γAq∗(55)
0 = Ξ2 · (st − µ) + µ+ βE [pt+1|st]− pt − γAq∗(56)
This is a stationary problem and all the future periods will be the same in expec-
tations given today’s signal:
E [pt+1|st] = E [dt+1|st] + βE [pt+2|st]− γAq∗(57)
Iteratively substituting equation (57) in equation (55) leads to the following rep-
resentation of the problem:
0 = Ξ2 · (st − µ) + µ+
T∑
t=1
βt (µ− γAq∗)(58)
+βT+1 (E [pt+T+2] γAq∗)− pt − γAq∗
This can be simplified by taking the limit of T →∞:
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt (µ− γAq∗) = µ
1− β +
γ
(1− β)Aq
∗(59)
lim
T→∞
βT+1 (E [pt+T+2] γAq∗) = 0(60)
Rearranging terms one gets:
q∗ =
(1− β)
γ
A−1
(
Ξ2 · (st − µ) + µ
1− β − pt
)
(61)
Thus (61) is the optimal trading strategy of the agent group given the attention
allocation Ξ and the received signal st.
Step 2: In equilibrium the agent group has to hold all assets. Normalizing
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them to one, q∗ = 1, yields the equilibrium market prices:
pt = Ξ
2 · (st − µ) + µ
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(62)
Step 3: With the market clearing price, the agent can solve the attention
allocation problem of the first stage, where he maximizes his utility (I) compared
to the case where he receives no signals (II).
The attention allocation problem needs to be viewed from an individual agents
point of view, who is competing against all other agents of his generation and the
following one.
(63) max
sit∈Γ
E
u(c∗t ; sit) + βu(c∗t+1; sit)︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
− u (c∆t )− βu(c∆t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
sit

Since the agent can not influence the second period outcomes by his action,s
behaves like a price taker and in equilibrium every agent will hold the same
amount of assets, the problem reduces to:
(64) max
st∈Γ
E
[
u(c∗t ; s
i
t)− u(c∆t )sit
]
The relevant parameter for the signal choice is only the correlation ρn between
dn,t and sn,t. In the context of our model ρn is dependent on σ˜n, the only free
parameter, since all noise terms are assumed to be independent. The correlation
ρn therefore only depends on the variance of the additional noise term of the
signal:
ρ (dnt, snt) = Cor (µn + σnnt, µn + σnnσ˜nψn)(65)
= Cor (σnnt, σnn + σ˜nψn)(66)
=
Cov (σnnt, σnn + σ˜nψn)√
V ar (σnnt)V ar (σnn + σ˜nψn)
(67)
=
σ2n√
σ2n (σ
2
n + σ˜
2
n)
(68)
=
σn√
(σ2n + σ˜
2
n)
(69)
= ρn ∈]0, 1](70)
Consequently, the signal structure can be seen as only dependent on the corre-
lation parameters ρ1 and ρ2.
24 Combining this with the fact that in equilibrium
24Since for a corner solution, meaning ρn = 0, the signal is irrelevant, we can simply set σ˜2n = η for
any η ∈ N to close the set.
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the expected utility without any informative signal E
[
u(c∆t )
]
is constant for all
choices of correlation one can reduce the optimization problem regarding the sig-
nals to:
(71) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
E [u(dt; st)st (ρ1, ρ2)]
Assuming mean-variance utility it follows that:
(72) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
E
[
E [dt|st (ρ1, ρ2)]− γ
2
V ar [dt|st] st (ρ1, ρ2)
]
With two assets the aggregated dividend is dt = d1,t+d2,t leading to the following
representation of our optimization problem:
max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
E
[
E [d1t + d2t|st]− γ
2
V ar [d1t + d2t|st] st (ρ1, ρ2)
]
(73)
This can be decomposed to:
(74) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
E [d1tst (ρ1, ρ2)] + E [d2tst (ρ1, ρ2)]− γ
2
V ar [d1t + d2tst (ρ1, ρ2)]
As we are looking for the optimal correlation of the signals and the fundamentals,
all constant parameters or level variables can be neglected for the optimization
problem and the only uncertainty arises in the second moments. Furthermore,
both dividend processes are uncorrelated and thus an equivalent optimizing prob-
lem is given by:
(75) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
−V ar [d1tst (ρ1, ρ2)]− V ar [d2tst (ρ1, ρ2)]
Applying the rules for dependent mean and variance of correlated normally dis-
tributed variables:25
max
{ρ1ρ2}∈[0,1]
−σ21
(
1− ρ21
)− σ22 (1− ρ22)(76)
Again ignoring all constant parameters for the optimization, the reduced form is:
(77) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
σ21ρ
2
1 + σ
2
2ρ
2
2
Step 4: For tractability we replace
{
ρ21, ρ
2
2
}
by {ξ1, ξ2} in the reduced opti-
25(x1|x2 = a) ∼ N
(
µˆ, Σˆ
)
, with µˆ = µ1 + Σ12Σ
−1
22 (a− µ2) and Σˆ = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21.
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mization problem:
(78) max
{ξ1,ξ2}∈[0,1]
σ21ξ1 + σ
2
2ξ2
subject to the information processing constraint
(79)
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ξ1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ξ2
)
≤ κ
Since the objective function is increasing in both choice variables the information
processing constraint will be binding at any maximum. Therefore one can rewrite
this constraint imposing strict equality. Reformulating the log2’s to ln’s we arrive
at:
ln( 11−ξ1 )
ln(2)
+
ln( 11−ξ2 )
ln(2)
= 2κ(80)
exp (2κ ln(2)) =
1
1− ξ1
1
1− ξ2(81)
(1− ξ1) (1− ξ2) = 1
exp (2κ ln(2))
(82)
ξ1 + ξ2 − ξ1ξ2 = 1− 1
exp (2κ ln(2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
(83)
ξ1 + ξ2 − ξ1ξ2 − α = 0(84)
The first order condition of the corresponding Lagrange auxiliary function
(85) L = σ21ξ1 + σ22ξ2 + λ (α− ξ1 − ξ2 + ξ1ξ2)
are:
[ξ1 :]
(86) σ21 + λ (ξ2 − 1) = 0
[ξ2 :]
(87) σ22 + λ (ξ1 − 1) = 0
[λ :]
(88) α− ξ1 − ξ2 + ξ1ξ2 = 0
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Dividing (86) by (87)
(89)
σ21
σ22︸︷︷︸
κ2
=
1− ξ2
1− ξ1
The inner solution follows from a reformulation of (88) leading to the trajectory:
(90) ξ2 =
α− ξ1
1− ξ1
Plugging (90) into (89) yields:
κ2 =
1− α−ξ11−ξ1
1− ξ1(91)
=
1− α
(1− ξ1)2
(92)
Solving for (1− ξ1):
(1− ξ1)2 = 1− ακ2(93)
1− ξ1 = ±
√
1− α 1
κ
(94)
Since {ξ1, ξ2} ∈ [0, 1], the only plausible solution is given by:
(95) ξ∗1 = 1−
√
1− α 1
κ
From (89) one can derive the condition for a corner solution, meaning of a state,
in which the second asset will be neglected, specifically ξ∗1 = α = 1 −
(
1
4
)κ
and
ξ∗2 = 0, as:
(96) 4κ < κ2
Using κ1 =
1
2 log2
(
1
1−ξ1
)
it follows that:
(97) κ1 =

κ if κ2 > 4κ
1
2κ+
1
2 log2 (κ) if κ
2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]
0 if κ2 < 14κ
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Thus after reconverting ξ1 into ρ1:
(98) ρ∗1 =

√
1− (14)κ if κ2 > 4κ√
1− 1κ
(
1
2
)κ
if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]
0 if κ2 < 14κ
and due to symmetry:
(99) ρ∗2 =

0 if κ2 > 4κ√
1− κ (12)κ if κ2 ∈ [ 14κ ; 4κ]√
1− (14)κ if κ2 < 14κ
C. Proof of Proposition 3
We add two groups of investors with the same information processing capacity
to the model of section II.A. Group one with relative magnitude λ and optimal
information allocation ρ∗1 and group two with relative magnitude 1−λ and optimal
information allocation ρ∗2. The resulting optimal asset allocations for each agent
group are:
q∗1 =
(1− β)
γ
A−1
(
ρ∗21 · (s1t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(100)
q∗2 =
(1− β)
γ
A−1
(
ρ∗22 · (s2t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(101)
In equilibrium the following equation has to hold, since all assets, normalised to
one, have to be held by the agents:
1 =
(1− β)
γ
A−1(102) (
λρ∗21 · (s1t − µ) + (1− λ) ρ∗22 · (s2t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
Rearranging terms leads to the following price formula:
pt = λρ
∗2
1 · (s1t − µ) + (1− λ) ρ∗22 · (s2t − µ)(103)
+
µ
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1
= ρ∗2 ((λs1t + (1− λ) s2t)− µ) + µ
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(104)
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The variance A is given by:
(105) A = σ2(1− ρ∗2) + β
(
σ2 +
(
λ2 + (1− λ)2
)
σ˜2
)
ρ∗4
This collapses to the matrix of the non heterogeneous case for λ = 0 and λ = 1.
Note that ρ∗1 = ρ∗2 = ρ∗.
Generalizing to G equally large groups with independent signals one obtains
the price as:
pt = ρ
∗2
(
G∑
n=1
1
G
snt − µ
)
+
µ
1− β −
γ
2(1− β)A1(106)
The variance A with G groups is given by:
(107) A = σ2(1− ρ∗2) + β
(
σ2 +
1
G
σ˜2
)
ρ∗4
Thus the price variance for asset one is given by:
V ar (pt) =
(
σ2 +
1
G
σ˜2
)
ρ∗4(108)
The variance of the price is therefore not only a question of attention alloca-
tion but also a question of how many independent opinions are present. Higher
volatility in distress situation may not only result from more attention allocation
but also because of more homogeneity, meaning less independent groups.
D. Proof of Proposition 4
Within our framework the household problem for the individual agent is given
by:
max
sit∈Γ
E
[
u(cit; s
i
t) + βu(c
i
t+1; s
i
t)s
i
t
]
(109)
subject to the following constraints
I
({dt} ;{sit}) ≤ κi(110)
qi∗t+1 = arg max
qit+1
E
[
u(cit; s
i
t) + βu(c
i
t+1; s
i
t)s
i
t
]
(111)
cit = q
i∗
t+1 (dt − pt)(112)
cit+1 = q
i∗
t+1pt+1(113)
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The agent has mean-variance utility:
u(c) = E [c]− γ
2
V ar [c](114)
Solving this household problem analogous to Proposition 2 yields the following
FOC for the quantity of assets the agent wants to hold:
0 = E [dt|st] + βE [pt+1|st]− pt − γAq∗(115)
0 = ρ∗21 (s1t − µ) + ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt(116)
+βE [pt+1|ρ]− pt − γAq∗
0 = ρ21 (s1t − µ) + ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt(117)
+
N∑
i=1
βi
(
ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ− γAq∗
)
+βN+1 (E [pt+N+2] γAq∗)− pt − γAq∗
0 = ρ∗21 (s1t − µ) +
N∑
i=0
βi
(
ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt − γAq∗
)
(118)
−pt
We assume updating of the agent’s best guess µt about µ˜. The agent forms his
new opinion on µ˜ by weighting his signal on the mean s2t and his previous belief
µt−1 by the quality of the signal he receives, thus µt = ρ22s2t + (1 − ρ22)µt−1.
The variance of µ˜ is assumed to be σ22 for each generation to ensure a stationary
problem. This results in the optimal asset allocation:
q∗ =
(1− β)
γ
A−1(119) (
ρ∗21 (s1t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt
1− β − pt
)
In equilibrium the agent group has to hold all assets, normalized to one:
1 =
(1− β)
γ
A−1(120) (
ρ∗21 (s1t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt
1− β − pt
)
Solving for the price leads to:
pt = ρ
∗2
1 (s1 − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s2 − µt) + µ+ µt
1− β −
γ
(1− β)A1(121)
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The variance A is given by:
A = σ21(1− ρ∗21 ) +
σ22
(1− β)2 (1− ρ
∗2
2 ) + βσ
2
1ρ
∗2
1(122)
+
β
(1− β)2 ρ
∗2
2 σ
2
2
With a closed form solution for the price at hand we can turn to the attention
allocation problem. Analogue to the proof of proposition 2 the simplified opti-
mization problem ignoring all constant parameters is given by:
(123) max
{ρ1,ρ2}∈[0,1]
σ21ρ
2
1 +
σ22
(1− β)2 ρ
2
2
This is equivalent to the step 4 in the proof of proposition 2 when simply replacing
σ2 by
σ2
(1−β) .
E. Proof of Proposition 6
In equilibrium expected prices for all future periods are identical:
µ˜ = µt+i∀i ∈ N→ E [Rt| µ˜ = µt]− (µ˜+ µt) = 0(124)
During a (positive) shift, which implies non perfect information processing mean-
ing ρ22 < 1 and µ˜ > µt, µt+1, the expected excess return is given by:
E [Rt| shift]− (µ˜+ µt) = E
[
ρ22 (s2t+1 − µt+1) + µ+ µt+1
1− β(125)
− γ
(1− β)A1
−ρ
2
2 (s2t − µt) + µ+ µt
1− β
+
γ
(1− β)A1
]
=
1
1− β ρ
2
2 (µ˜− µt+1)(126)
Since µ˜ > µt+1 holds because of the ongoing shift equation (126) will be positive
during a (positive) shift.
During a negative shift the same arguments hold but it implies a negative
expected excess return. The model does not imply a possible excess return for the
agent on an individual asset, since he does not have the shift information (which
is actually forward looking) in his signal, which encompasses all the information
he can acquire.
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F. N Asset Allocation
max
ξn∈[0,1]
N∑
n=1
σ2nξn(127)
N∑
n=1
1
2
log2
(
1
1− ξn
)
≤ κ(128)
We first look at the general case of a non-corner solution. Simplifying the bound-
ary condition by only taking into account first order and first order interaction
effects we obtain:
N∑
n=1
ξn −
N∑
n=1
N∑
j=n+1
ξnξj = α(129)
As before α is given by:
α = 1− 1
exp (2κ ln(2))
(130)
In case of two assets this is equal to:
(131) ξ1 + ξ2 − ξ1ξ2 − α = 0
The FOC for a maximum, meaning setting the normal of the differentiable man-
ifold equal to a multiple of the gradient of the target function, is given by:
(132)

0 1 ... 1 σ21
1 0 ... 1 σ22
...
1 ... 1 0 σN2


ξ1
...
ξN
λ
 =

1
...
...
1

We define:
(133) Ψ =

0 1 ... 1
1 0 ... 1
... ... ... ...
1 ... 0 1
1 ... 1 0

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Thus we obtain:
(134) ξ(λ) = Ψ−1

1
...
...
1
− λ

σ21
...
...
σ2N

λ∗ is given by the solution to the following quadratic equation:
(135)
N∑
i=1
ξi(λ)−
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ξi(λ)ξj(λ) = α
We obtain the optimal allocation as:
(136) ξ∗(λ∗) = Ψ−1

1
...
...
1
− λ∗

σ21
...
...
σ2N

For N = 1 this trivially leads to ξ∗ = α and for N = 2 in case of an inner
solution to:
λ∗ =
√
1− α
σ1σ2
(137)
ξ∗ =
(
1−√1− ασ2σ1
1−√1− ασ1σ2
)
(138)
This is identical to the model without approximation for the one and the two
asset case, since the approximation is exact for up to two assets because only for
three and more assets higher order interaction terms exist, which are lost due to
the approximation.
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G. Proof heterogenous information processing capacities
The derivation to proposition (7) of the equilibrium in the case of heterogeneity
among agents if they have different information processing capacities follows the
same steps as in the baseline model (see proof of proposition 2):
Given any optimal attention allocation the optimal asset allocation of both
investor groups is given by:26
q∗1 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1(
Ξ21 · (s1t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(139)
q∗2 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A2 + A˜
)−1(
Ξ22 · (s2t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(140)
A1 and A2 are the variances associated with the dividends for each of the investor
groups and A˜ the variances of future prices. In order to shorten notation we define
τi as:
τ1 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
(141)
τ2 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A2 + A˜
)−1
(142)
In equilibrium the sum of all assets has to equal the total supply of one:
1 = λτ1
(
Ξ21 · (s1t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(143)
+ (1− λ) τ2
(
Ξ22 · (s2t − µ) +
µ
1− β − pt
)
(144)
Solving for the price this leads to:
pt =
µ
1− β + ω
(
Ξ21 · (s1t − µ)
)
+ (1− ω) (Ξ22 · (s2t − µ))− Ω1(145)
with
ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1 λτ1(146)
Ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1(147)
26For the attention allocation process a fixed trading strategy q¯ = 1 needs to be assumed as a technical
assumption.
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Thus the variance matrices for the two investor groups are given by:
A˜ = β[
(
ωΞ21 + (1− ω) Ξ22
)2
(148)
+
(
ω2
(
Ξ21 − Ξ41
)
+ (1− ω)2 (Ξ22 − Ξ42))](σ21 σ22
)
(149)
Ai =
(
σ21
σ22
)(
1−
(
ρ∗2i1
ρ∗2i2
))
(150)
The values for ω are implicitly given as the solution to the following equation:
ω =
(
λ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
+ (1− λ)
(
A2 + A˜
)−1)−1
λ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
(151)
Unfortunately there exists no closed form solution to equation (151) and thus the
value of ω has to be obtained numerically. Since however ω can be pre-computed
the loss as compared to a closed form solution is rather small.
42 WORKING PAPER
H. Proof shift in the long-term
This is the proof to proposition (8). In addition to proposition (7), each group
of agents has now current beliefs µ1t, µ2t of the long-term mean, which they
update every period. This allows for heterogeneity in the dynamics in the long-
term mean expectations. The optimal asset allocation of both groups is given
by:
q∗1 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
(152) (
ρ∗21 (s11t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s12t − µt) + µ+ µ1t
1− β − pt
)
q∗2 =
(1− β)
γ
(
A2 + A˜
)−1
(153) (
ρ∗21 (s21t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s22t − µt) + µ+ µ2t
1− β − pt
)
Using the same notational short cuts as before the price will be:
pt = ω
(
ρ∗21 (s11t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s12t − µt) + µ+ µ1t
1− β
)
(154)
+ (1− ω)
(
ρ∗21 (s21t − µ) +
ρ∗22 (s22t − µt) + µ+ µ2t
1− β
)
−Ω1
with
ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1 λτ1(155)
Ω = (λτ1 + (1− λ) τ2)−1(156)
Thus the variances for the two investor groups are given by:
A˜ =
(
ωρ∗211 + (1− ω) ρ∗221
)2
βσ21(157)
+
(
ω2
ρ∗412
(1− β)2 + (1− ω)
2 ρ
∗4
22
(1− β)2
)
βσ22
+ω2β
(
ρ∗411σ˜
2
11 +
ρ∗412
(1− β)2 σ˜
2
12
)
+
(
1− ω2)β(ρ∗421σ˜221 + ρ∗422
(1− β)2 σ˜
2
22
)
Ai = σ
2
1
(
1− ρ∗2i1
)
+
σ22
1− β
(
1− ρ∗2i2
)
(158)
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As with the model without shifts the values for ω are implicitly given as the
solution to the following equation:
ω =
(
λ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
+ (1− λ)
(
A2 + A˜
)−1)−1
λ
(
A1 + A˜
)−1
(159)
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